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INTRODUCTION
Today, national economic growth depends heavily on innovation.
Innovation, in the form of applied knowledge that creates new value, is
∗
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not the only critical input to economic growth, of course. Capital, labor,
and natural resources all play important roles, as they have traditionally.
But innovation is the plus factor—the ingredient that spawns
breakthrough efficiencies, boosts productivity, and rewards producers
and customers alike. Represented by intellectual property, which
includes patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets, innovation
fosters new products that achieve what their predecessors could not,
delivers improved processes for the creation of goods and services, and
guides businesses in what to do—and equally important what not to
do—to be successful.
Not all innovation is of comparable import. Some new ideas
represent game–changing breakthroughs that, in turn, stimulate new
ecosystems of value creation. The Internet is a prime example. So are
fundamentally new product concepts, such as the advent of the personal
computer in the 1980s, or the creation of mobile computing devices in
the past few years. Breakthrough innovations threaten the existence of
previous forms of products and services, as in the way that the Internet
has disrupted the old telephone networks of the twentieth century. Such
discontinuity is likely to come from outside an established industry,
introducing “[e]ntirely new competitors or new suppliers.” 1
Incremental innovation is valuable, but in a different way,
improving prior products and services, but not necessarily displacing
them. A new version of Microsoft’s Windows operating system, for
example, can extend and expand innovation without fundamentally
breaking with the past. 2
Given the recognized importance of innovation as an input to
national economic growth, it is not surprising that nations are focused
on how to boost innovation, including, for example, through support of
basic R&D, improvements in the availability of capital for start-up
businesses, and greater educational opportunities in science, technology,
engineering, and mathematics (so–called “STEM” programs).
Because innovation results from the creative use of both preexisting and new knowledge, nations have focused on the identification
and protection of intellectual property, which is the body of law that
creates protectable property rights in inventions and learning. For
example, the passage of the America Invents Act in 2011 3 represented a
decision by Congress and the President to emphasize both the

1 MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: CREATING AND SUSTAINING SUPERIOR
PERFORMANCE 197 (1985).
2 The example is courtesy of Pradeep Tumati, Types of Innovations, GO4FUNDING,
http://www.go4funding.com/Articles/Types-Of-Innovations.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
3 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be codified
in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
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importance, and the quality, of U.S. patents. 4
China has also taken steps to encourage the creation of intellectual
property by Chinese companies. This Article will first examine the
nature of those policies, then consider their impact on the goal of better
innovation in China, as well as the impact on multi-national companies
that wish to do business in China. The Article will conclude with
suggestions about the best ways to build innovation policy to encourage
sustainable relationships between China and multi-national companies.
I. CHINA’S PATENT AND INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICIES
Having achieved rapid economic growth in the prior three decades,
Chinese policymakers have turned their attention to improving the
nation’s capacity for innovation. The core goal: “to encourage
manufacturers to move up the value chain and advance rapidly to the
global technology frontier (and in some areas, push that technology
frontier forward),” while also “nurturing a culture of open innovation
[so that] the services sector could also be an important beneficiary” of
increased innovation. 5
Patents are an important tool for nurturing innovation and Chinese
policy incentivizes its businesses to file for patent protection. China
issues invention patents, utility model patents (which do not exist in the
United States), and design patents, which vary in the extent to which
novelty and inventiveness are required. 6 Just as important for purposes
of this analysis, China has adopted a series of goals and incentives to
increase the number of patent filings. As described by a recent study
4

See Quentin Palfrey, The America Invents Act: Turning Ideas into Jobs, WHITE HOUSE
BLOG (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/09/16/america-invents-act-turningideas-jobs.
5 THE WORLD BANK & THE DEV. RESEARCH CTR. OF THE STATE COUNCIL, CHINA, CHINA
2030: BUILDING A MODERN, HARMONIOUS, AND CREATIVE HIGH-INCOME SOCIETY 19 (2013),
available
at
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/China-2030complete.pdf [hereinafter CHINA 2030].
6 DAN PRUD’HOMME, EUROPEAN CHAMBER, DULLING THE CUTTING EDGE: HOW PATENTRELATED POLICIES AND PRACTICES HAMPER INNOVATION IN CHINA 3 n.1 (2012), available at
http://www.europeanchamber.com.cn/upload/media/media/27/patentstudy2012%5B766%5D.pdf
(“Invention patents can be granted to both products and processes, and must meet a standard for
novelty (not part of the ‘prior art,’ i.e. not openly known to the public abroad or in China before
their filing date), ‘inventiveness,’ and practical use as determined by a review called a
Substantive Examination. Utility models can be granted on the shape and/or structure of a
product, and do not undergo a Substantive Examination but are required to be novel, meet a far
lower level of ‘inventiveness’ than invention patents, and must meet criteria for practical
use/functionality. Invention patents and utility models enjoy basically the same level of legal
protection during their lifetimes. Design patents are granted on the appearance of a product that
makes it particularly recognisable, do not undergo a Substantive Examination nor have to meet
any technical or functional thresholds but must be distinct from prior designs, and should not
conflict with prior rights like copyrights or trademarks.”).
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commissioned by the European Union Chamber of Commerce, those
incentives begin with national and provincial quantitative patent
targets. 7 For example, the 12th Five Year Plan, which runs from 2011–
2015, calls for invention patents to increase from 1.7 to 3.3 for every ten
thousand people by 2015. 8 China has also established the goal of being
among the top five countries in the world by 2020 for the purposes of
the issuance of invention patents. 9 Other policies to encourage the filing
of patents include subsidies, tax rules, governmental procurement, and
standards–making processes. 10
The number of patents alone does not, however, correlate directly
to the quality (or even the quantity) of innovation. In this respect, close
attention must be paid to “utility model” patents. Utility model patents
were originally created to provide a quick, inexpensive option for
individuals and small businesses to procure shorter-term intellectual
property protection for inventions that fell short of the requirements of
an invention patent. To achieve that purpose, utility model patents do
not require the same level of inventiveness as that required of invention
patents under Chinese law, 11 and are issued without any substantive
examination of the claimed innovation. 12
According to a recent report published by the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, the impact of utility model patents has been contrary to the
original governmental expectations: “[i]nstead of simply encouraging
inventors, the less costly patent prosecution process is yielding utility
model patents that are inexpensive, unexamined, rapidly granted, and
difficult to invalidate when necessary, resulting in patent weapons that
are disruptive to normal business growth.” 13
Non–Chinese companies may become more concerned about the
cumulative effect of China’s policies to encourage the filing of patents,
alongside its broader “Indigenous Innovation Policy,” which has itself
been controversial. That policy began in 2006 with the issuance of the
State Mid-to-Long Term Science and Technology Development Plan

7
8
9
10
11

Id. at 62.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Compare China’s Patent Law (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Mar. 12, 1984, effective Apr. 1, 1985) Ch. II art. 22, available at
http://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/lawsregulations/201101/t20110119_566244.html
[hereinafter
China’s Patent Law] (establishing the standard for an invention patent as “prominent substantive
features and represents notable progress”), with id. (establishing the standard for a utility model
patent as “substantive features and represents progress”).
12 China’s Patent Law, supra note 11, at Ch. IV art. 40. By comparison, issuance of an
invention patent requires a substantive examination. China’s Patent Law, supra note 11, at Ch. IV
art. 39.
13 THOMAS T. MOGA, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, CHINA’S UTILITY MODEL PATENT
SYSTEM: INNOVATION DRIVER OR DETERRENT 8 (2012).
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2006–2020 (MLP) 14 by the State Council. The MLP calls for reducing
China’s dependence on foreign technology and directs that the number
of invention patents granted to Chinese nationals annually rank in the
top five nations in the world by 2020. 15
In addition, several implementing measures of the MLP link
indigenous innovation development to government procurement
policies. For example, the disclosure that indigenous innovation
development was to be implemented through procurement decisions
under the central government procurement product catalogue in 2009
attracted wide protests from non–Chinese companies. In reaction to
those protests, the Chinese government modified its written policies
favoring fostering indigenous innovation through government
procurement, but the extent to which the policy has been actually
changed, especially at the provincial level, is uncertain. 16 As a whole,
the policy has been described as “a massive and complicated plan to
turn the Chinese economy into a technology powerhouse by 2020 and a
global leader by 2050.” 17
II. CHINA’S INNOVATION: METRICS AND COLLABORATION
The former Director of the United States Patent and Trademark
Office has recognized that, “[p]atent filings do not equal innovation, by
any stretch.” 18 There are a number of reasons why the existence of a
patent does not necessarily demonstrate true innovation. First, not all
patents, in U.S. or China, are high quality—a risk that is especially
likely in connection with China’s utility model patents, discussed above,
which are subject to lower standards of inventiveness and review and
undergo no substantive examination upon grant (or registration).
Second, not all patents are commercialized (indeed, the
14 THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, GUOJIA ZHONGCHANGQI
KEJI FAZHAN GUIHUA GANGYAO [THE NATIONAL MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM PROGRAM FOR
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT] (2006-2020) (2006) [hereinafter MLP], available at
http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-02/09/content_183787.htm,
available
in
English
at
http://www.cstec.org/uploads/files/National%20Outline%20for%20Medium%20and%20Long%2
0Term%20S&T%20Development.doc.
15 See id.
16 Stanley Lubman, Changes to China’s ‘Indiginous Innovation Policy’: Don’t Get Too
Excited,
WALL
ST.
J.,
July
22,
2011,
12:53
PM,
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/07/22/changes-to-chinas-indigenous-innovation-policydont-get-too-excited/.
17 JAMES MCGREGOR, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, CHINA’S DRIVE FOR ‘INDIGENOUS
INNOVATION’: A WEB OF INDUSTRIAL POLICIES 4 (2011).
18 Gregory Ferenstein, Patent Director: ‘Patent Filings Do Not Equal Innovation,’ U.S.
Needs
New
Measure,
FAST
COMPANY
(Mar.
12,
2011),
http://www.fastcompany.com/1738089/patent-director-patent-filings-do-not-equal-innovation-usneeds-new-measure (quoting David Kappos, Dir. of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office).
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commercialization of patents is probably a better measure of market
value than their existence per se). Third, some patents are created and
used for defensive purposes associated with litigation risk. Fourth,
patents may serve to complicate if not actually impede innovation
through the existence of patent “thickets,” 19 a risk especially in the
Information Technology sector where, for example, a single smartphone
can contain as many as 250,000 patents. 20
As noted above, the 12th Five Year Plan for National Economic
and Social Development of China 21 sets quantitative targets for
obtaining patents. China’s National Patent Development Strategy
(2011–2020) 22 requires that by 2015: (i) annual patent filings (the total
number of filings for invention patents, utility model patents and design
patents) reach two million/year; (ii) China ranks among the top two
nations in terms of annual number of invention patents granted to its
citizens; and (iii) more than 8% of industrial enterprises above a
designated size (defined as businesses with annual revenue from
principal business activities of RMB 20 million) will have patent filings.
To that end, the State Council’s Notice on Strengthening IPR Works in
Strategic Emerging Industries (issued in April 2012) 23 set the target of
tripling, by 2015, the number of invention patents and international
patent filings in strategic emerging industries (as compared to 2010).
In response to the numerical targets set by the central government,
local governments formulated their own numerical targets. For example,
Beijing’s 12th Five Year Plan on Intellectual Property (Patent)
Development jointly issued by the Beijing Intellectual Property Bureau
and the Beijing Development and Reform Commission, has one
subsection titled “Key Numerical Targets,” which includes the goal of
“[e]ndeavor[ing] to achieve annual growth rate of 5% in terms of patent

19 A patent thicket has been defined as “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property
rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new
technology.” Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 120 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds.,
2001), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/thicket.pdf.
20 Steve Lohr, Apple-Samsung Case Shows Smartphone as Legal Magnet, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
26, 2012, at A4.
21 THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, GUOMIN JINGJI HE SHEHUI
FAZHAN DISHI’ERGE WUNIAN GUIHUA GANGYAO [THE 12TH FIVE YEAR PLAN FOR NATIONAL
ECONOMIC
AND
SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT
OF
CHINA]
(2011),
available
at
http://www.gov.cn/2011lh/content_1825838.htm.
22 STATE INTELL. PROP. OFFICE, NATIONAL PATENT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY (2011–2020)
(2010),
available
at
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/ztzl/ndcs/zscqxcz/2011ipweek/tpstr2011/201104/t20110419_598974.htm
l.,
available
in
English
at
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/SIPONatPatentDevStrategy.pdf.
23 Notice on Strengthening IPR Works in Strategic Emerging Industries, OFFICE OF THE
STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (April 28, 2012),
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2012-05/02/content_2127881.htm.
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filings and patents granted during the 12th five year plan.” 24
Recently, the Deputy Director of China’s State Intellectual
Property Office (SIPO) explained that within the first ten months of
2012, the domestic invention patent filings accepted by SIPO totaled
386,000, up by 26.5% over the same period of 2011; domestic invention
patents granted in force totaled 120,000, up by 32.9% over the same
period of 2011. 25 By end of October 2012, the number of invention
patents per 10,000 people reached 3.09, up by 30.4% over the end of
2011. 26
The granting of utility model patents is increasing in a similar way.
By the end of December 2010, for example, China had granted 849,454
utility model patents that were still in force, but only 257,893 invention
patents. 27 In 2011, when total patent applications in China grew by
33.6% from the previous year, there were more applications for utility
model patents than for either invention or design patents. 28
The intention of the Chinese Government to set quantitative patent
targets is to stimulate innovation. 29 In reality, heavy focus on
quantitative patent targets may incentivize the pursuit of immediate and
incremental results over breakthrough innovation. That’s because high–
quality breakthrough technology developments usually require longer
term research and development, frequently measured in years. In
addition, under the pressure of the “state–planned” system of metrics,30
enterprises may try to achieve numerical patent targets at the cost of
quality, by circumventing rules and regulations regarding monitoring
and evaluation. 31 This is facilitated by the fact that China’s overall
regulatory and enforcement systems remain less developed than those of
Western countries, 32 for example in ensuring the operation of an
independent judiciary.
It is understandable that firms would prefer quantitative targets
than qualitative targets, because success is easier to gauge with the use
of numerical measures.
24 BEIJING INTELL. PROP. OFFICE, BEIJING’S 12TH FIVE YEAR PLAN ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
(PATENT)
DEVELOPMENT
(2007),
available
at
http://www.bjipo.gov.cn/zcfg/zlgh/201202/t20120207_25714.html.
25 Woguo Mei Wanrenkou Faming Zhuanli Yongyouliang Yida 3.09 Jian [the Number of

Patents owned by China has Reached 3.09 per 10,000 people], STATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
OFFICE (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.sipo.gov.cn/yw/2012/201211/t20121130_776050.html.
26 Id. As noted above, the goal for 2015 is 3.3 invention patents for every ten thousand
people. PRUD’HOMME, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
27 In addition, China had granted 718,056 design patents. MOGA, supra note 13, at 19.
28 Id.
29 See, e.g., supra notes 7–10, 14–17 and accompanying text (establishing China’s
motivations behind its innovation policies).
30 See supra notes 7–10 and accompanying text.
31 See MCGREGOR, supra note 17, at 65.
32 See generally PRUD’HOMME, supra note 6, at 125–40 (discussing regulatory and
enforcement issues in China).
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Furthermore, it is believed that some entities file patent
applications principally for the purpose of obtaining additional subsidies
from the local governments. 33 Thus, one expert in Chinese intellectual
property has concluded that the existence of a large number of “junk
patents” has been prompted by governmental subsidies that promote
quick payment over quality patents. 34
Taking all these above factors into consideration, there are valid
concerns about the extent to which the focus on numerical targets
actually furthers the Chinese’s governmental goal of creating important
new kinds of innovation. This dilemma is being recognized within
China. For example, Ms. Liu Yan, the Secretary General of
Organization Committee of China Patent Annual Conference (2011),
was reported to have said during that conference that although patent
filings in 2010 reached a new high of 1.222 million, the large number of
patent filings cannot conceal the relatively low overall quality of
Chinese patents. 35
An important contribution to the discussion about China’s
economic future came earlier this year from a joint set of
recommendations issued by The World Bank and the Development
Research Center of China’s State Council, which is headed by the
Premier of China and is China’s senior administrative body. 36 That
report concluded that “China has seen a sharp rise in scientific patents
33 China Economic Weekly: 3,000,000 patent, the number of “junk”?, PEOPLE’S DAILY
ONLINE (July 31, 2006), http://news.people.com.cn/GB/37454/4650184.html. Tian Lipu, Director
of SIPO stated
during recent years, local governments have issued some subsidy policies in order to
encourage patent applications. These policies have been playing positive roles in
encouraging creation and invention and improving the enthusiasm of the Chinese to
innovate. But these policies have shortcomings. For example, the number of patent
applications is taken as the evaluation criteria, thus a small number of patent applicants
file patent applications for existing technology without making any improvement, in
order to obtain subsidy. This is the subjective cause of ‘junk patents’. Therefore,
guidance shall be given to local governments to improve patent fee subsidy and
incentive policies, suggesting them focusing on invention patents with high-tech
contents so as to eradicate the phenomenon of filing malicious application in order for
getting subsidy.
Id. The Vice Director of Guangzhou Intellectual Property Office was similarly quoted as
explaining that “the reason for existence of ‘junk patents’ is that utility model patents and
design patents, before being filed for patents, are publicly known or used by the public, and
applicants file patent application for things which have been known to the public for many years.”
Id. (emphasis added).
34 More harm than good “junk patents” enterprise innovation, CNIPR (Nov. 23, 2011),
http://www.cnipr.com/focus/sdbd/201111/t20111123_138667.html. Utility model patents and
design patents are sometimes classified as “junk” patents because the standards for their issues is
not as rigorous as with invention patents. See MOGA, supra note 13, at 16.
35 China’s patent applications last year, the first break million overall quality is still not high,
CHINA NEWS NETWORK (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.chinanews.com/cj/2011/1110/3450986.shtml.
36 The State Council, THE CENTRAL PEOPLE’S GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, http://english.gov.cn/links/statecouncil.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2013).
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and published papers, but few have commercial relevance and even
fewer have translated into new products or exports.” 37 Why? Perhaps
because of the “weak incentives for indigenous, government–backed
research institutes to work with commercial users of new technologies”
and, or, because “research institutes may not be capturing opportunities
to leverage their capabilities by networking within their country and
connecting with global R&D networks.” 38
In sum, China has set specific goals for patent innovation and
appears to be on the way to achieving them. But those goals—set out as
numerical targets and supported by subsidies and other governmental
actions—are themselves only weakly correlated to break-through
innovation and, in fact, may not even reflect significant incremental
innovation. Moreover, by focusing attention on misguided measures of
short-term success, they may actually detract Chinese innovators from
forming valuable collaborative relationships with global R&D creators
and customers. The next section of this Article examines the impact of
current Chinese innovation policies on the formation of those kinds of
relationships.

III. COLLABORATION AND INNOVATION: IMPACT ON MULTI-NATIONAL
CORPORATIONS
The previous section suggested that, on its own terms, the
emphasis on numerical metrics for patent filings is not well–matched
with China’s goal of increasing innovation. This section looks to
additional impacts on innovation development, particularly on the
ability of non–Chinese multi-national corporations to collaborate with
Chinese entities.
The starting point is the nature of innovation in the world today.
Increasingly the concept of “innovation” is being coupled with
“collaboration.” In other words:
[I]nnovations are increasingly brought to the market by
networks of firms, selected according to their comparative
advantages, and operating in a coordinated manner. In this new
model, organizations de-construct the innovation value chain
and source pieces from partners that possess lower costs, better
skills and/or access to knowledge that can provide a source of
differentiation. The aim is to establish mutually beneficial
37 CHINA 2030, supra note 5, at 35. The report made an exception to this statement for
telecommunications and consumer electronics. Id.
38 Id.
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relationships through which new products and services are
developed. In short, firms increasingly seek superior
performance in innovation through collaboration. 39
Multiple reasons exist for this shift away from a focus on
internally–created innovation within a single corporation’s R&D
department. Dynamic fast-moving markets force change on companies
rapidly and from multiple directions, which puts greater premium on the
ability to work with different sets of external collaborators, often
simultaneously. The massive improvements in information technology
make collaboration over long distances more practical. On a local level,
increased understanding of the competitive advantages of geographic
“clusters” demonstrate the importance of shared resources that create
the spillover effects that economists label “positive externalities.” 40
It is not surprising, therefore, that large innovation–focused
multinational companies have embraced collaboration. Proctor &
Gamble famously announced in 2001 that “50% of its innovation would
contain a significant component of external collaboration.” 41 Cisco has
concluded that “[i]mproved collaboration is a largely untapped source
of competitive advantage.” 42 DuPont emphasizes the importance of
“inclusive innovation” to meet the world’s biggest challenges, including
agriculture, energy, and environment. 43
Belief in collaboration is not, however, confined to Western multinational corporations. The “China 2030” Report discussed above
specifically notes that “[c]loser collaboration and partnerships with
multinationals on the basis of mutual trust and recognition will
contribute to the creation of a dynamic and open innovation system” in
China. 44

39 Alan MacCormack, Theodore Forbath, Peter Brooks & Patrick Kalaher, Innovation
through Global Collaboration: A New Source of Competitive Advantage 1 (Harvard Bus. Sch.,
Working
Paper
No.
07-079,
Aug.
14,
2007),
available
at
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/07-079.pdf (emphasis omitted).
40 Jonathan Sallet, Innovation Policy in Tough Times on Tight Budgets: The Case for
Regional
Innovation
Clusters,
SCIENCE
PROGRESS
(Oct.
8,
2010),
http://scienceprogress.org/2010/10/innovation-policy-tight-budgets-and-tough-times/.
“Externalities refers to situations when the effect of production or consumption of goods and
services imposes costs or benefits on others which are not reflected in the prices charged for the
goods and services being provided.” Glossary of Statistical Terms: Externalities, OECD,
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3215 (last visited Apr. 23, 2013).
41 Partnering
with
the
World
to
Create
Greater
Value,
P&G,
http://www.pg.com/en_US/downloads/innovation/C_D_factsheet.pdf.
42 Collaboration: The Next Revolution in Productivity and Innovation 4, in THE CISCO
BUSINESS
TRANSFORMATION
SERIES:
COLLABORATION,
CISCO
(2008),
http://www.cisco.com/web/offer/cioday2009/Cisco_Collaboration_Revolution.pdf.
43 Solving Global Challenges Together, DUPONT, http://www2.dupont.com/inclusiveinnovations/en-us/gss/global-challenges.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2013).
44 CHINA 2030, supra note 5, at 35.
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Similarly, the Director of the Research Center of Multi-National
Corporations, Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic
Cooperation, Ministry of Commerce of China, Wang Zhile, emphasized
in 2006 that foreign–created, China–based R&D centers are part of
China’s innovation system, pointing out ways that China can cooperate
with multi-national corporations. 45 In 2010, the Deputy Minister of
Science and Technology of China, Cao Jianlin, called on foreign
universities, research institutes, and foreign companies to continue
cooperation and joint R&D efforts with Chinese partners to innovate
continuously and achieve “win-win” outcomes. 46
The advantages of cross-border collaboration have been recognized
by Chinese businesses as well. For example, the CEO of Neusoft, which
has grown in the last twenty years into China’s largest Chinese medical
system and equipment provider, attributes Neusoft’s success to its open
and collaborative innovation ecosystem, including its joint venture with
Phillips. 47 Similarly, the Chairman of Nantian Electronics Information
Corp., Ltd. (Nantian), the leading Chinese IT company in banking
automation, cites Nantian’s open innovation success in working with
IBM to develop software for mainframe computers and with HP to
construct a large–scale core banking service system based on cloud
computing. 48
The difficulty is that the emphasis on the number of patents as a
sign of true innovation achievement in fact appears to frustrate
achieving true innovation—decreasing the ability of multi-national
corporations to collaborate effectively with Chinese counterparts.
First, the focus on filing for patents risks distraction. Any
organization executes to its defined goals, and if the goal is to file
patents, then resources and attention will necessarily follow. Moreover,
the fact of patent filing itself may be viewed as indication of innovation
per se. In these circumstances, Chinese entities may be less interested in
collaboration simply because collaboration is not as directly additive to
their ability to file for a patent (and might even compromise their ability
to claim sole ownership and seek subsidies).
Second, the emphasis on utility model patents leads almost entirely
to incremental, not breakthrough, innovation. Putting aside the question

45 Experts said foreign-funded R & D institutions is an integral part of China’s innovation
system, SINA (Aug. 27, 2006), http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20060827/1755885731.shtml.
46 Ministry of Science and Technology Cao Jianlin: hope multinationals to set up R & D
center
in
China,
SOHU
IT
NEWS
(Sept.
19,
2010),
http://it.sohu.com/20100919/n275096931.shtml.
47 A road of innovation of Chinese enterprises: Neusoft Group Chairman and CEO Liu Jiren
interviews,
GANSU
ECONOMIC
INFORMATION
NETWORK
(Feb.
14,
2012),
http://www.gsei.com.cn/html/GSIT/dtxx/762_145227.html.
48 Open innovation to lead the continuing development of the southern sky, NANTIAN (July
11, 2011), http://www.nantian.com.cn/ShowArticle.Aspx?ArticleID=12686.

WANG de novo, FINAL (2 AC edits) (Do Not Delete)

2013

9/23/2013 6:16 PM

COLLABORATIVE INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

159

of whether utility model patents should be classified, as some do, as
“junk” patents, 49 the legal standard for utility model patents under
Chinese law is expressly lower than an invention patent (and the term of
protection is shorter). 50 This lessens the likelihood that major
innovations will be the goal or the result of work that leads to the filing
of a utility model patent. 51 Collaboration for the purpose of
breakthrough innovations becomes less important to an organization
that does not have the goal of achieving that level of step-change
achievement.
Third, the focus on numbers may send the wrong message about
collaboration. China is obviously interested in improving its national
innovation capacity and demonstrating its strength as an innovator on
the world stage. But the danger of the numerical goals is that they
strongly imply that Chinese companies are better off if they go it alone,
without multi-national partners, even if the impact of collaboration
would be to improve innovation outcomes in China and other countries.
In fact, devoting time and attention to low–quality patents for the sake
of meeting numerical targets actually takes resources away from
research and lessens the alignment between productive research and
successful business strategy.
That is why the question of patent metrics should be examined in a
larger context. As discussed above, China’s Indigenous Innovation
Policy has been criticized for linking national goals to the development
of intellectual property by Chinese companies (or the transfer of
intellectual property ownership to them). 52
Furthermore, multi-national corporations have encountered a series
of difficulties in establishing sustainable working relationships and
protecting their intellectual property. Two prominent examples have
arisen in the high-speed train and wind-turbine industries. In 2004,
China’s Ministry of Railway sought bids to supply cars and locomotives
for high-speed trains, but limited eligibility to locally–incorporated
companies (excluding wholly-owned subsidiaries of foreign companies)
49
50

See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
China’s Patent Law, supra note 11, art. 42. The term of protection for an invention patent is
20 years, while the term for protection for a utility model patent is 10 years.
51 This conclusion is not always so, because inventors in China may file simultaneously for
both invention and utility model patents but the general practice is to choose the invention patent
when the process ultimate forces a choice. China’s Patent Law, supra note 11, at Ch. 1 art. 9;
Wei-Ning Yang & Andrew Y. Yen, The Dragon Gets New IP Claws: The Latest Amendments to
the Chinese Patent Law, 21 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 18, 20 (2009), available at
http://www.ipo.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Patents&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&C
ontentID=25439.
52
Domestic
Innovation
and
Procurement,
CHINA
BUS.
REV.
(2010),
https://www.chinabusinessreview.com/public/1003/uscbc.html; Spike Nowak, On the FastTrack: Technology Transfer in China, GATEWAY HOUSE (Aug. 31, 2012).
available at http://gatewayhouse.in/publication/gateway-house/features/fast-track-technologytransfer-china.
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and required winning companies to transfer their key technologies to
their Chinese partners. 53 Over the next few years, contracts were won
by joint ventures partially owned by non–Chinese companies including
Bombardier, Kawasaki, and Siemens. 54 Soon Kawasaki’s partner
became a competitor, building its own train sets and filing for over one
hundred patents on high-speed train sets despite Kawasaki’s claims that
it had originally developed some of the technologies. 55
Also in 2004, China launched the “Wind Power Concession
Project,” requiring bidders to include 70% local content in wind-power
equipment, reducing reliance on imported wind turbines by favoring
domestic production of wind power equipment.56 In order to qualify for
bidding, foreign companies had to set up production in China or source
components or parts from China. 57
Given such policies, multi-national corporations may have become
more hesitant to engage in collaboration, R&D, and manufacturing in
China with Chinese partners. Some may include only older technology
in their China–based operations. Others may look for collaborators
outside of China, including in other parts of Asia.
Because successful collaboration is a two-way street, lost
opportunities from diminished collaboration detracts from China’s
innovation objectives, as well as on prospects for multi-national
partners. A particularly good example comes from the use of trade
secrets in manufacturing processes. Trade secrets are not patented, but
they are protected intellectual property under the laws of both the
United States58 and China. 59 Trade secrets are valuable information in
53 Toh Han Shih, China’s Rail Titans Bid for U.S. High-Speed Project, MASS TRANSIT
MAGAZINE (June 22, 2011), http://www.masstransitmag.com/news/10284479/chinas-rail-titansbid-for-us-high-speed-project; Norihiko Shirouzu, Train Makers Rail Against China’s High
Speed
Designs,
WALL ST. J.,
Nov.
18,
2010,
at
A1,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704814204575507353221141616.html; Brian
Spegele, Train Spat With Japan Heats Up, CHINA REAL TIME REPORT, WALL ST. J., July 8,
2011, 7:32 PM, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/07/08/train-spat-with-japan-heats-up/.
54 Shirouzu, supra note 53; Spegele, supra note 53.
55 Shirouzu, supra note 53; Spegele, supra note 53.
56 See Snapshot: Renewable Energy—China’s Imbalanced Trade, POWER-TECH. (May 18,
2011), http://www.power-technology.com/features/feature119046.
57 DEWEY & LEBOEUF LLP FOR NAT’L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, CHINA’S PROMOTION OF
THE RENEWABLE ELECTRIC POWER EQUIPMENT INDUSTRY: HYDRO, WIND, SOLAR, BIOMASS II
(2010),
available
at
http://www.nftc.org/default/Press%20Release/2010/China%20Renewable%20Energy.pdf;
Jim
Hight, Building Bridges for Climate Change Mitigation: A Roadmap of Global Trade Patterns in
Wind Power Goods and Services, GLOBAL FORUM ON TRADE: TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGE,
OECD (2009), at 17, available at http://www.oecd.org/tad/envtrade/42886096.pdf.
58 In the United States, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act’s definition states:
‘Trade secret’ means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
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which a company may invest tremendous financial resources and labor
resources. Thus, trade secrets have become an important corporate asset.
One analysis in 2005 calculated that intangible assets reportedly
constituted 79.7% of the total value of the Standard & Poor’s 500 and
that the vast bulk of intangible assets were trade secrets. 60 Many
industries rely heavily on trade secrets to establish and retain their
competitive
advantages, including the
chemical
industry,
pharmaceutical industry, biotechnology industry, and food-andbeverage industry. Some often cited examples of trade secrets include
the Coca Cola formula and the Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) chicken
recipe.
The trade secrets of multi-national corporations are not wellprotected in China. One analysis showed that “trade secret cases are the
least likely to succeed of any civil IP litigation in China.” 61 A report in
2012 from the Shanghai/Pudong Basic Court found that plaintiffs
prevailed in only two of sixty-two trade secret cases between 2002 and
2011. 62
Hence, “[w]estern companies rarely sue Chinese companies over
trade secret theft in China—in part because of perceptions they will not
be viewed fairly, but also out of fear of retaliation in the marketplace.”63
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain
its secrecy.
UNIF.
TRADE
SECRETS
ACT
§
I
(4)
(1986),
available
at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trade%20secrets/utsa_final_85.pdf.
59 In China, the Law Against Unfair Competition states that trade secrets “refers to any
technology information or business operation information which is unknown to the public, can
bring about economic benefits to the obligee, has practical utility and about which the obligee has
adopted secret-keeping measures.” Law of the People’s Republic of China Against Unfair
Competition, art. 10 § 3, available at
http://law.npc.gov.cn:87/page/browseotherlaw.cbs?rid=en&bs=97709&anchor=0#go0.
60 JOHN R. THOMAS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE ROLE OF TRADE SECRETS
IN INNOVATION POLICY 2 (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R41391.pdf;
James E. Malackowski, The Intellectual Property Marketplace: Past, Present and Future, 5 J.
MARSHALL REV. OF INTELL. PROP. L 605, 611 (2006), available at http://www.jmripl.com.php510.dfw1-2.websitetestlink.com/issues/article/122; R. Mark Halligan, Protection of U.S. Trade
Secret Assets: Critical Amendments to the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 7 J. MARSHALL
REV. OF INTELL. PROP. L. 656, 657–58 (2008), available at http://www.jmripl.com.php510.dfw1-2.websitetestlink.com/issues/article/172.
61 What the Data Says About Trade Secret Litigation in China, CHINA IPR (Oct. 31, 2012),
http://chinaipr.com/2012/10/31/what-the-data-says-about-trade-secret-litigation-in-china/..
62 Shanghai Pudong New Area Court Research Report on the Situation of Trade Secret
Litigation in Accordance with the Law, PEOPLE’S COURT NEWS, June 28, 2012, available at
http://pdiprlaw.org.cn/pdcqw/web2011/xxnr_view.jsp?pa=aaWQ9NTE4ODQmeGg9MQPdcssPd
cssz. According to the report, among the 62 cases, 28 cases were tried by the Pudong Basic Court.
26 were withdrawn, 2 were deemed as withdrawn or 4 were settled and 2 were referred to other
courts. Id. Among the 28 trials, in only 2 cases the court upheld all the claims of the plaintiff and
in 10 cases, the court upheld part of the claims of the plaintiff. Id.
63 Nicola Groom, Wind energy dispute may test U.S.-China IP resolve, REUTERS, Jan. 9,
2012,
1:43
PM,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/09/us-amsc-sinovel-
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Some companies have sought recourse, instead, in non–Chinese venues,
such as the U.S. International Trade Commission in cases involving
solar panels, 64 railway wheels, 65 and rubber resins. 66 Separately, Sinovel
Wind Group Company, a Chinese wind-turbine manufacturer, has been
accused of theft of trade secrets of AMSC, a U.S. manufacturer. 67
In sum, the impact of current Chinese patent strategy, especially
when considered in the context of technology-transfer and failure to
protect intellectual property, is to decrease the incentives of both
Chinese companies and multi-national corporations in establishing
cutting-edge innovation collaborations. China is too big a market and
too large an economy for all such relationships to be deterred. But
collaboration at sub-optimal levels decreases innovation opportunities
for both China and multi-national corporations.
Consider a little–known, but important example of the kind of
knowledge that is very difficult to acquire without collaboration and
that, therefore, may be missing from China’s innovation policies. The
understanding of how to accomplish a task is called “know-how” and
it’s a very valuable form of trade secret. 68 An important part of knowhow is the knowledge of what has been tried that didn’t work. That goes
by the name “negative know-how,” and it’s a trade secret that directly
boosts efficiency. 69 Suppose a scientist looking to create a new form of
synthetic fiber tries twenty different combinations, only one of which is
successful. In the short term, that one formula is obviously valuable.
But in the long-term, so is the learning from the nineteen failures; not
idUSTRE8081RT20120109.
64 Matthew L. Wald, Panel Says Chinese Imports Hurt U.S. Solar Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3,
2011, at B4.
65 Intellectual Property News: ITC Affirms Amsted’s Victory Against U.S. and Chinese Cast
Steel
Railway
Wheel
Competitors,
RFC
EXPRESS
(Dec.
8,
2009),
http://www.rfcexpress.com/news/article.asp?ID=4783.
66 Eric W. Schweibenz & Alexander B. Englehart, SI Group Files New 337 Complaint
Regarding
Certain
Rubber
Resins,
LEXOLOGY
(May
22,
2012),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=cd5b22d9-34ff-40dd-82de-9f7b344645dc.
67 See U.S. wind firm presses theft charge against China rival, WIND DAILY (Feb. 6, 2012),
http://www.winddaily.com/reports/US_wind_firm_presses_theft_charge_against_China_rival_99
9.html; Andrew Lee, AMSC and Sinovel due in China’s Supreme Court over wind IP, CHINA
INTELL. PROP. (Oct. 25, 2010), http://www.chinaipmagazine.com/en/news-show.asp?id=5353
(“The legal battle between AMSC and Sinovel—formerly its biggest customer—centres on theft
of wind turbine IP by a former employee of the US company in Austria, allegedly at the behest of
Sinovel. The employee was jailed by an Austrian court last year.”); see also WHITE HOUSE,
ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY ON MITIGATING THE THEFT OF U.S. TRADE SECRETS (2013),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/admin
_strategy_on_mitigating_the_theft_of_u.s._trade_secrets.pdf.
68 See Protection of Undisclosed Information (Trade Secrets or Knowhow), BUSINESS
PORTAL INDIA, http://business.gov.in/legal_aspects/undisclosed_information.php (last visited
Apr. 23, 2013).
69 See Wayfinder Digital's alphabetical list of terms, words, jargon, patentspeak, concepts,
and buzzwords about patents and intellectual property, WAYFINDER DIGITAL, (last visited Apr.
23, 2013), http://wayfinderdigital.com/glossary.html#N.
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only because scientists in the future can avoid replicating those
experiments, but also because they convey a deeper knowledge of the
process of innovation. Understanding of process is, of course, at the
heart of manufacturing excellence.
Negative know-how is hard to acquire without investment over a
length of time and without trying multiple unsuccessful solutions. It
often involves collaboration. It seldom is written on a single piece of
paper or described as a specific formula. It’s the culmination of time
and effort that resides within the DNA of a successful enterprise. It can
be shared with a willing partner who brings complementary knowledge
and expertise to a common objective. It is summed up in the observation
that “dead ends can sometimes be very enlightening.” 70 Negative knowhow, however, often can only be protected as a trade secret. So China’s
poor record of trade secret protection tends to discourage multinationals from collaborating on process improvements with Chinese
enterprises. 71
In other words, negative know-how, despite being often not chosen
as a subject for patent protection, is a good example of a “win-win”
outcome. There appears to be a tendency to sometimes view any desire
for “win-win” as a sign of weakness. But this is counter-productive
because it discourages collaboration. OECD research suggests, for
example, firm-specific advantages of collaboration. “[F]irms that
collaborate on innovation spend more on innovation than those that do
not [perhaps because] collaboration is likely to be undertaken to extend
the scope of a project or to complement firms’ competencies.” 72 The
implication, of course, is that collaboration allows companies to succeed
more and expand further and faster than they could acting alone. In
order to have a relationship based on mutual trust and mutual respect,
the question each collaborative partner should ask is: “how do I make
my partner successful,” rather than, “how do I make myself successful
at the cost of my partner?”
In sum, China’s current emphasis on numerical goals, amidst the
context of other impediments to cross-national collaboration, does not
appear to be the most impactful strategy for achieving its desired ends.

70 Teresa M. Amabile, How to Kill Creativity, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1998 77, at 83.
71 See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text.
72 OECD, MEASURING INNOVATION: A NEW PERSPECTIVE, 27 (2010), available at

http://www.oecd.org/site/innovationstrategy/measuringinnovationanewperspectiveonlineversion.htm#agenda.
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IV. POLICY IMPROVEMENTS TO FOSTER MUTUALLY–BENEFICIAL
COLLABORATION
As China continues to consider improvements in its innovation
policies, thought should be given to factors, forces, and policies that
improve the ability of Chinese companies to create sustained
collaboration with multi-national companies, especially the global
innovators who have demonstrated ability to foster breakthrough
innovation.
The first step is, of course, to remove current barriers to
collaboration, such as the procurement, technology-transfer, and
intellectual property rights issues detailed above. 73 As explained in that
prior discussion, the application of “Indigenous Innovation” policies,
that link procurement decisions to the ownership of intellectual property
by Chinese companies to the detriment of non–Chinese firms, along
with the application of policies that seem to require transfer of
technologies from non–Chinese companies to their Chinese partners,
matched by the lack of effective protection of intellectual property
rights of Chinese and non–Chinese companies alike are all seen by
multi-national companies as problematic and an obstacle to true
collaboration. 74 The current emphasis on quantitative targets for patents
is a more subtle obstacle, but an important one.
The second step is to improve the measurement of innovation—a
challenge that is shared by developing and developed economies alike. 75
The challenge is not simple, but neither is it unique; venture capital
firms and other investors often assess the innovation achievements and
potential of a firm. Better measurement tools would allow China to
create incentives for innovation, from Chinese and non–Chinese firms
alike. Policies connected to procurement, subsidies, and standardssetting should be better tailored to boost true innovation, rather than
preferring innovation, of whatever quality, that is produced or owned
only by Chinese entities. 76 Similarly, high-tech multi-national
investment in R&D facilities should “be further encouraged because of
its significant spillover effects, the reputational gains for those Chinese
cities that are fast becoming science hubs, and the contribution this
research can make to industrial upgrading.” 77
73
74
75

See supra Parts II, III.
See supra Part III.
Both the OECD, and the U.S. Department of Commerce have focused specifically on how
to improve measurement of innovation. See OECD, supra note 72, at 11–17; Rachel Barker,
Measuring Innovation, WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS (Mar. 21,
2011), available at http://americaandtheglobaleconomy.wordpress.com/2011/03/21/measuringinnovation/.
76 PRUD’HOMME, supra note 8, at 119.
77 CHINA 2030, supra note 5, at 35.
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Alongside such progress should come specific reform of the
intellectual property protection regime in China. Of course, protection
of valid intellectual property rights, without regard to the identity or
nationality of the owner is vital. In addition, China’s patent laws also
should be reformed to more closely require substantive innovation
achievements as a pre-requisite to granting of utility model patents. 78
And trade secrets should be better protected. The judicial administration
of trade secret litigation is problematic, both because of questions of the
independence of the judiciary from governmental or political decisions
and because evidentiary requirements in Chinese courts place
unnecessary obstacles in the way of plaintiffs seeking relief from trade
secret misappropriation. For example, a plaintiff must prove to a
Chinese court that: (1) its business secret meets the statutory
requirements, (2) the information of the defendant is similar or
substantially similar to its business secret, and (3) the defendant has
used unfair means. 79 Yet, “[b]ecause there is no U.S.–style discovery in
China, plaintiffs must collect and submit their own evidence to meet
their burden of proof regarding, inter alia, trade secret misappropriation
and damages [and] Chinese courts rarely accept evidence unless in its
original form; therefore, documentary evidence is practically the only
form of evidence that carries significant weight in a Chinese court.” 80
The Chinese government additionally should consider direct
policies that incent collaborative cross-border success. For example, a
tiered R&D tax credit could be made available to Chinese and multinational firms that form a collaborative innovation-based enterprise.
The amount of the tax credit could be increased after three years, and
again after five years if the collaborative enterprises remain productive.
That would boost the continuation, not just creation, of collaborative
enterprises.
Indeed, as a general matter, it is important for China to consider
the impact of its innovation and intellectual property rules and
regulations on the incentives for cross-border collaboration and R&D
investment in China. 81
78
79

MOGA, supra note 13, at 31.
Interpretation of Supreme People’s Court on Some Issues Concerning the Application of
Law in the Trial of Civil Cases Involving Unfair Competition art. 14 (Announcement of the
Supreme
People’s
Court)
(Jan.
12,
2007),
available
at
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/law_en_info.jsp?docid=76558.
80 J. Benjamin Bai & Guoping Da, Strategies for Trade Secrets Protection in China, 9 NW. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 351, 362 (2011). In addition, evidence that originates outside of China is
only admissible in China if it is notarized in the foreign country, confirmed by a Chinese embassy
or consulate and then translated into Chinese in China by a translation company that is authorized
by a Chinese court. See J. Benjamin Bai, Peter J. Wang & Helen Chang, What Multinational
Companies Need to Know About Patent Enforcement and Patent Litigation in China, 5 NW. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 449, 459 (2007).
81 For example, SIPO released a set of Draft Regulations on Service Invention in November

WANG de novo, FINAL (2 AC edits) (Do Not Delete)

166

C A R D O Z O LA W R E V I E W D E • N O V O

9/23/2013 6:16 PM

2013

CONCLUSION
This Article has briefly reviewed China’s current emphasis on the
number of patents that are filed by Chinese enterprises, concluding that
such quantitative measures may not foster the kind of innovation,
especially breakthrough innovation, that China seeks. At the same time,
those kind of numerical metrics, alongside other barriers to multinational participation in the extant China innovation ecosystem, such as
inadequate protection of intellectual property rights, discourage crossborder collaboration of the kind that provides a robust pathway to
breakthrough innovation and that would benefit China’s innovation
goals. This Article concludes with suggestions, based on the authors’
experiences, for the evolution of China’s innovation policy, in a world
of mutually–beneficial innovation. The authors look forward to
continuing a conversation with technology and innovation experts in
China, to foster mutual understanding, and facilitate improved
collaboration.

2012 for public opinion. Service Invention Remuneration Regulations, State Intellectual Property
Office
of
P.R.C.
(proposed
Nov.
12,
2012),
available
at
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/tz/gz/201211/t20121112_769843.html. The draft Regulations intend to
encourage innovation by providing incentives to inventors, however, “language in the draft
Regulations would create an unreasonable cost burden on companies conducting R&D in China
by driving up compensation levels well above international norms and creating significant
administrative burdens for companies with active patent portfolios. These high costs and
administrative burdens would make it difficult for domestic and foreign companies to invest in
R&D in China, ultimately reducing the amount of innovation that occurs in China.” US-CHINA
BUS. COUNCIL, COMMENTS ON DRAFT REGULATIONS ON SERV. INVENTIONS 1 (2012), available
at https://www.uschina.org/public/documents/2012/12/service-invention-comments.pdf.

